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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

POLICY TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

POLICY TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Ву

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ABSTRACT

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The list of countries possessing or attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction is growing. The United States should analyze the various options and formulate a consistent nuclear non-proliferation strategy. U.S. public policy has been to oppose nuclear proliferation, but; argue that retaining nuclear weapons enhance our security by deterring nuclear attack. Our inconsistency may not be sustainable, especially when the NPT comes up for re-negotiation. This paper explores the history of nuclear weapons and analyzes nuclear proliferation in the post-Cold War era. This investigation is limited to an overview of the problem, with a close focus on what analysts consider to be among the key issues: disarmament and the reversal of bilateral nuclear competition between the world's two biggest nuclear powers (the United States and Russia), deliberate proliferation by rogue states and undeclared nuclear powers, and proliferation stemming from "nuclear leakage" out of the former Soviet Union. A summary of non-proliferation policies along with a discussion of current world realities lead to the conclusion that the existing non-proliferation regime is losing its potency. There are no clear cut policies and easy military means for neutralizing nuclear weapons in the future most likely scenarios.

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POLICY TO CONTROL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the armories of nuclear powers, and the ever-present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security. In the euphoric aftermath of the collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, we have overlooked that the post-Cold War world is in many ways a more dangerous place than its Cold War predecessor. Relations among major powers, a primary factor in world order, are crucial to the future of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The fact that the United States no longer has a matching rival, and is the sole military superpower did not bring a stable New World Order, but rather a stream of conflict, threats and counter-threats to regional stability. Even though the risk of global nuclear war appears to be at an all-time low, the risk of nuclear attack, whether deliberate or accidental, appears to be at an all-time high.

"A National Security Strategy for a New Century" states weapons of mass destruction pose the greatest potential threat to stability and global security. Proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies threatens to provide rogue states, terrorists, and international crime organizations with the means to inflict terrible damage on the United States and its allies. Arms control initiatives are an essential element of our national security strategy and a critical complement to our efforts to defend our nation through our on military strength.² Controlling the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction is a vital interest of the United States. It is vital to the defense of our homeland, to a favorable world order, and to our economic well-being.

The use of nuclear weapons has disastrous and long-lasting consequences. No other cities must be put through the agony of recovery from their devastating effects endured by Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The abolition of these weapons of mass destruction is a long-cherished goal of the international community. Since the release of the Canberra Commission report in 1996, prospects for abolition have been weakened by many developments.³ The international community has reached a crossroads at which it must choose between the assured dangers of proliferation and challenges of disarmament. There can be no standing still.

A core question in the nuclear disarmament debate is whether nuclear deterrence or the abolition of nuclear weapons offers more national, regional, and global security. States possessing nuclear weapons continue to claim that they enhance their national security. But their actions may lead rivals to acquire weapons of mass destruction, leading to diminished security for both these states and their non-nuclear neighbors. National, regional and global security has not been enhanced by the possession of nuclear weapons.

Some advocates of retaining nuclear weapons claim that these weapons enhance security by deterring nuclear attack, the use of chemical and biological weapons, and large-scale conventional aggression. Some believe that the only function of nuclear weapons is to deter the use of other nuclear weapons. This core function is provisional, however, and must be accompanied by efforts to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion, negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament, which may be unanimously affirmed by the International Court of Justice.⁴

The United States has long taken the de facto role of "world's cop", administering justice and control in the remote nations. Treaties and non-proliferation agreements are certainly an attractive approach, eliminating/reducing the global nuclear threat. But, the question is, can we remain safe with a limited arsenal, can we be sure that no one else is breaking the treaty, and can we run the risk that one of the imperceptible and undetectable terrorist groups doesn't already have a nuclear weapon at the ready? Our political options are clear, we can devote ourselves to asserting the necessity of nuclear arms controls and continue to enforce those controls through our own military and political power. To examine these two concepts further, it is important to delve into the history of the current nuclear situation, the political policies that would achieve the greatest effect, and the military options available if all else fails.

Without a strong, effective United Nations, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament efforts will fall short. Halting the spread of arms and reducing and eventually eliminating all weapons of mass destruction are major goals of the United Nations. The UN has been an ongoing forum for disarmament negotiations, making recommendations and initiating studies. It supports multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament and in other international bodies. These negotiations have produced such agreements as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996) and the treaties establishing nuclear-free zones⁶. The UN encourages all nations to adhere to this and other treaties banning destructive weapons of war. The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency,

through a system of safeguards agreements, ensures that nuclear materials and equipment intended for peaceful uses are not diverted to military purposes. But the UN system is adrift, financially compromised, and playing a limited role in international relations, sometimes performing vital

services but sometimes bypassed entirely. The UN system reflects power relations and has suffered from deteriorating relations among major powers. The United Nations, however, remains an essential institution for moving international relations towards cooperative security. Its operational capabilities need to be strengthened. To deal effectively with international security problems in the next century, Security Council reform, new normative principles, operational arrangements, financial compliance and new sources of financing are urgently needed.

At stages during the Cold War, the common interests of the superpowers to avoid nuclear conflict were strong enough to moderate hostile behavior and create, through dialogue and confidence-building measures, some level of trust. Nothing of the like exists among the new proliferators and some of their neighbors.

What happens when a new country acquires nuclear capabilities? What does it do the regional balance of power? Taking a quick look at the strategic chain reaction that started with the nuclear devastation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki one can see the birth of the proliferation of nuclear weapons into the Middle East. China's development of the bomb in 1964 can be viewed as a rational strategic response to US threats to use nuclear weapons at the end of the Korean War and during the Taiwan straits crises of the 1950s as well as to the mounting tensions with the Soviets in the early 1960s during the cold war.8 India's nuclear proliferation is linked primarily to China (with whom it fought a war in 1962) and secondarily to Pakistan, with whom it fought in 1947, 1965, and 1971. Analysts report that India's nuclear development program began in earnest following the first Chinese nuclear detonation in 1964. Ten years and billions of dollars later, India responded with its own "peaceful nuclear explosion" in May of 1974.9 While India maintains an active nuclear weapons program, it has never been a declared nuclear power, and is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. From the perspective of Pakistan, India's historical enemy, the 1974 explosion was anything but peaceful. With what was rumored to be considerable assistance from China, Pakistan quickly developed its own nuclear capability. Responding both to the nuclear threat posed by Pakistan, an Islamic power, and to the presence of multiple Arab neighbors heavily armed with conventional weapons,

Israel had reportedly developed its nuclear capability by the early 1970s. Israel, suspected to have well-established nuclear weapons capabilities, is not a signatory of the NPT. Israel's possession of nuclear weapons is widely viewed as a provocative factor in Middle East relations.¹⁰

During the cold war, the fear of mutual assured destruction prevented the world's super powers from going to war and prevented them from using nuclear weapons. A suitable question may be asked is "are the Israeli and Arab leaders as rational as the U.S. and Soviet leaders were during the cold war?" Would an irrational leader such as Saddem Hussein launch a nuclear attack from his deathbed? Israel although has never publicly acknowledged a nuclear weapons program, is considered by the global community to possess nuclear weapons.

Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the possibility that nuclear arms would be found in the hands of terrorists and third-world nations was not considered to be a credible threat. As little as twenty years ago, in the beginning of the Reagan era, nuclear arms were the sole possession of only the world's most powerful militaries and economies. Yet, now with the nuclear non-proliferation treaties being ignored by some nuclear powers, and the emergence of Pakistan and India as members of the nuclear club threatening the stability of the world nuclear balance¹¹, and with the increasing instability at both the economic and political level throughout the former Soviet Union, the world is rapidly coming face to face with potential destructive possibilities. As controls have become less stringent, and the nuclear nations, including the United States, less apt to fully abide by any real disarmament treaty, the threats of the Cold War continue on without the fight being between just two nations.

Russia's growing irritation at US initiatives, which frequently ignore its views, has clear consequences for disarmament: ratification of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II.

Relations are also troubled between the United States and China. These two countries not only differ in their approaches to such fundamental issues as human rights, missile defenses,

Taiwan and non-proliferation but also have potentially conflicting visions of their roles in Asia, which could intensify in the next century. Europe, meanwhile, still lacks the sway it could hold in world politics. Concerns over WMD programs in North Korea and Iraq, in two unstable regions, have proved strikingly difficult to resolve, either through cooperation or pressure. In both cases, 1998 and 1999 have been years of reassessment and latent crisis¹².

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides the basis for concerted action, but neither the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) nor the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) are doing enough to reverse the unraveling of its regime. The Treaty should be

reaffirmed and revitalized. A comprehensive strategy would also utilize regional and other global non-proliferation instruments and arrangements, including nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) and effective but fair export controls¹³. Tightened controls on the world's vast quantity of nuclear

weapons-grade fissile materials, together with extensive transparency and monitoring, are essential to stop nuclear weapons spreading further. Ballistic missiles compound the dangers of nuclear proliferation, so any comprehensive non-proliferation strategy must also seek to limit their spread. At the turn of the 21st century, the momentum towards a universal and effective global nuclear non-proliferation regime generated by the close of the Cold War is in danger of being lost. The new nuclear proliferation challenges come from many directions. Poorly secured materials, technology or weapons may leak across borders. States claiming to adhere to the NPT or regional agreements may maintain clandestine programs¹⁴. Terrorists may acquire nuclear technology and materials. The terrorism and proliferation risks associated with tactical nuclear weapons are high. They are relatively vulnerable to theft and older models have less stringent precautions against unauthorized use.

The key commitment of NWFZ treaties is that states parties will not acquire nuclear weapons nor allow them to be stationed on their territories. They require nuclear-weapon states to make an unconditional commitment, known as a negative security assurance, that they will not threaten or use nuclear weapons against NWFZ states parties. The unconditional negative security assurances and the commitments by NWFZ states parties go well beyond those in the global non-proliferation agreements 15¹⁵. These regional compacts are now setting more far-reaching non-proliferation and disarmament goals than the global regimes. Part of their special value is that they demonstrate the commitments of many states particularly in the developing world to disarmament and non-proliferation. The regional nuclear-weapon-free zones can build high levels of confidence among various neighboring states. At the same time, regional nuclear-weapon-free zones are not substitutes for effective global regimes; each complements the other.

Treaties to create nuclear-weapon-free zones were signed in Latin America in 1967, the South Pacific in 1985, Southeast Asia in 1995 and Africa in 1996. All ban nuclear weapons within a specified territory, task the International Atomic Energy Agency with verification responsibilities, and establish permanent treaty organs. The 1995 Treaty of Bangkok has a system for dealing with allegations of non-compliance, which involves requests for clarification, requests for a fact-finding mission, and procedures for remedial action. The 1996 Treaty of

Pelindaba contains compliance provisions, mechanisms for the destruction of existing nuclear devices, commitments on conditions for exports to non-nuclear-weapon states, physical protection requirements, and prohibition of attacks on peaceful nuclear installations in the zone. Another agreement aimed at keeping nuclear weapons out of specific territory is the Joint Declaration on the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed in 1991 by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK). This was followed in 1992 by an Agreement on the Formation and Operation of the North-South Joint Nuclear Control Committee. The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and the DPRK reiterated the goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. Work is well advanced on creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia, where five states have agreed on a draft treaty and are now discussing it with the five nuclear-weapon states. The creation of such a zone is becoming increasingly important to global non-proliferation goals. Aspirations have also existed for many years to create zones in the Middle East, Central Europe and South Asia. Proposals have been made to formalize links between Southern Hemisphere zones 16.

Many countries that acceded to the NPT assuming there would be only five nuclear-weapon states (NWS) resent India's and Pakistan's tests as a challenge to their own policies of restraint. These tests, as well as complementary missile flight tests, greatly increase nuclear dangers in an area where four major conflicts between India and Pakistan, and one between India and China, have been fought since 1947. A capacity for mutual destruction does not ensure restraint. In the Middle East, where several armed conflicts have taken place since World War II, there is also the genuine possibility that further wars may involve weapons of mass destruction. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war there were reports that Israel had contemplated using nuclear weapons; and even the United States ordered a nuclear alert¹⁷.

Implementation of the bilateral US-Russia disarmament agenda is stalled, with major repercussions for global disarmament and non-proliferation. The Russian Duma will have difficulty ratifying START II in the near future; START III may remain an unrealized treaty unless new efforts are made to reaffirm the START process. It would be a major setback if the two major nuclear powers abandoned their joint efforts in strategic reductions. It is too early to tell if the US-Russian Joint Statement of 20 June 1999 can revive START¹⁸. Tactical nuclear arsenals are also of increasing concern. Despite accounting for more than half of the global stockpile of nuclear warheads, they are not covered by any agreement. Both the United States and Russia maintain high alert rates for large numbers of nuclear weapons, based on plans of massive attack, which have lost their meaning. Such plans are especially dangerous when

Russia's early warning and command and control systems are weakened and its political structure is unstable.

Large nuclear stockpiles have been produced since the 1940s, and now plutonium and highly enriched uranium is being extracted from thousands of dismantled nuclear warheads. Despite international cooperation to strengthen Russia's capacity to control its fissile material, much remains to be accomplished; concerns persist that its fissile material may disseminate beyond its borders. Four nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom) have announced moratoria on producing fissile materials for weapons. It is hoped that China, India, Israel and Pakistan will also declare moratoria and adhere to them¹⁹.

One of the most pressing nuclear proliferation problems facing the world lies in the sheer amount of stockpiled fissile material for nuclear weapons, and the problems of keeping it secure and disposing of it safely and irreversibly. The problem is most acute in Russia and some other parts of the former Soviet Union. About 3,000 tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) exist in the world, of which less than one percent is under safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Two-thirds of the world's plutonium and highly enriched uranium was produced specifically for military purposes, and two-thirds of this about (1,300 tons) is now considered surplus to military requirements. The United States and Russia have the largest stockpiles of fissile materials, with hundreds of tons each. France, the United Kingdom and, reportedly, China each have roughly tens of tons, and India, Pakistan and Israel hundreds of kilograms each of fissile material²⁰. But the size of national stockpiles is not the only measure of the danger they pose. While the non-nuclear-weapon states are legally obliged under the NPT to place their fissile materials under the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, there is no treaty to control fissile materials in the nuclearweapon states or the non-NPT countries. Some of the nuclear-weapon states, however, have taken steps to assist accounting and control. In the nuclear-weapon states and non-NPT states, military inventories of fissile material are subject to national controls but not to any external checks²¹. Nor are the responsible bodies always fully accountable to national legislatures.

Over the past twenty years, multiple non-proliferation treaties have been signed by various nations at different times with the hope that the destruction of our civilization may be averted in the future. Historically, however, few nations agree to disarm themselves. Rather, they would prefer to maintain at least some edge over their neighbor, thus assuring their safety. However, as was the case throughout the Cold War, more than one can play the one-

upmanship game. In either direction, there is potential benefit and risk. The greatest risk, until the collapse of the Soviet Union, was that either the United States or the USSR would push the other just a bit too far and the world would be blinked out of existence. Such global destruction continues to be possible, but much less likely than the threat of a nuclear attack with a single weapon. In Russia alone, there are "approximately 27,000 nuclear warheads and 1,300 tons of fissile material lying around, providing a tempting smorgasbord for wannabe terrorists,"22. Security for and around the Russian nuclear arsenal is notoriously lax and already there are significant amounts of uranium unaccounted for. These two factors, combined with the sheer number of unemployed nuclear engineers throughout the former Warsaw Pact countries, could quite clearly result in multiple terrorist organizations or terrorist-sponsoring countries to put together a weapons package. On the other hand, there are voices that attempt to reduce the perceived threat of nuclear terrorism. Some argue that "there is no reason to believe that terrorists, who have never utilized nuclear weapons in previous attacks, will turn to them in the future,"23 This rather naïve thought fails to take into consideration the historical fact that terrorists will use whatever is available to them when it becomes available. Even if no terroristlevel nuclear arms exist yet, one must prepare for the worst, and hope for the best. The threat of nuclear terrorism is very real, just as it continues to be a possibility between nations (India and Pakistan recently squared off, bristling with nuclear arms) and our policy must reflect that risk.

The current world-view of nuclear weapons is that they represent an unacceptable threat, particularly to those nations without them. In effect, an aggressive nuclear power could potentially hold an entire hemisphere or the world hostage. One obvious policy choice, then, would be to completely destroy all nuclear weapons everywhere. "The danger of premeditated nuclear war with Russia has practically disappeared, and the conventional military threats once thought to require deterrence with nuclear weapons are likewise diminished," A call for unilateral disarmament is, at this time, unrealistic. Instead, over the course of the past three decades, attempts to stop the rampant stockpiling of the Cold War and to effect their reduction have been the focus of treaties such as SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. What has remained clear, however, is that the threat of nuclear exchange has not been diminished in any great way by any of the world events.

The collapse of the Soviet Union did not reduce the number of nuclear arms available to the militaries of the world. Rather, it simply fractured their supply. "The balance between risks and benefits has shifted, allowing the changes that have already been implemented in U.S. nuclear posture, such as the withdrawal of most tactical weapons from Europe, the elimination of aircraft standing alert, and the elimination of tactical weapons on U.S. Ships."²⁶. Policy decisions have, of late, sought to decrease the overall risk of global nuclear destruction by dropping military use levels of arms to a response capability only. In effect, reducing arms levels to the point where a first strike is virtually impossible is one of the most viable and potentially effective policy ideas to date. Part of the effort to enact effective nuclear policy has been to eliminate anti-ballistic missile technologies such as the Star Wars systems of the early 1980's and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Shield under current consideration by the Bush Administration. The first real policy decision, agreed upon by many nations but never put into actual words or effect, would be to declare, "that they will never be the first to use nuclear weapons,"278. The result of such a global agreement would be that the door would be opened for eventual total disarmament. Second, many have proposed that the U.S.'s nuclear arsenal be removed from its current alert status. In the current response system, nuclear arms are primed, loaded, and ready to fire within minutes of a command being given. The danger involved in such hair-trigger readiness is that rash decisions could be carried out and not retracted. However, by removing our missiles from alert status, "would increase the amount of time needed to launch nuclear missiles from minutes to hours,"289.

Enforcement of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty would also make for a strong statement towards nuclear arms control. A "missile shield", in any format represents a significant risk in that it would effectively negate another nation's nuclear missile deterrent. As originally worded, the ABM treaty "gave each [nation] added confidence that the other would not be tempted to strike out,"2910. If all nations are aware that each can fire off a return salvo, thus assuring mutual destruction, deterrence is in effect. However, if one nation develops technology that prevents another from being able to retaliate or fire a first strike, that nation is neutered. Policy, then, must reflect the fragile nature of nuclear arms agreements. For many nations, the very presence of a single nuclear weapon, let alone the tens of thousands that are currently available, is cause enough for worry. Political policy clearly must be aimed not at the possibility that we may want to strike out against another nation with nuclear weapons, but at preventing such an attack against ourselves.

All policy and history would be as nothing, however, if a nuclear attack did occur. Our traditional response plan as a nation, were an attack to come from the Soviet Union, would be

to launch a massive response of missiles launched from submarines, land-based silos, surface ships, and aircraft. The effect would be one of unconscionable destruction and would disrupt the entire world economy, political systems, and support networks for generations. At one time, the only real way to respond to another nation's nuclear arsenal was to build one of your own.

Now, however, with the reduced threat of superpowers engaging in strategic nuclear war, the danger of nuclear attack comes primarily from rogue nations and terrorist groups. Determining how to respond appropriately to such threats has proven to be quite difficult. Our current nuclear arsenal has been "divided into tactical and strategic [weapons]...it [is] assumed that tactical nuclear weapons would be used in the same way as large-scale conventional weapons. They would be targeted against supply lines, or in conjunction with chemical weapons to blast a gap in [enemy] defenses," 3011. However, this type of response is only viable with a clearly defined enemy state/army, which is massed, in sufficient numbers to warrant such attack. Against the threat of a single nuclear weapon being set off within the United States or against our military on the field, the only justifiable response is surgical attack against the responsible nation/party. In the case of domestic terrorism, the only real weapon is diligence and an increased awareness of risk among our law-enforcement and counter-terrorism agencies. Against the threat of global war, however, it continues to be necessary to maintain a military empowered with the might of nuclear weapons as retaliation against non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction (chemical or biological agents) and nuclear weapons.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the state of world nuclear control has deteriorated significantly. Historically, nuclear attacks were prevented through the threat of mutually assured destruction. No one would attack because they themselves would be destroyed. Yet, now, with the possibility of small nations and terrorist groups gaining control over such weapons, there is a new form of risk. U.S. policy must continue to move toward reduction in arms to levels of response only, move our missiles off of alert status, and continue to enforce the ABM and similar treaties against further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan awoke the world to the reality that the spread of nuclear weapons had reached a dangerous new phase. Two regional powers with unresolved antagonisms had made their nuclear ambitions overt. The tests reflected the failure of global non-proliferation norms to prevail over regional security imperatives, and increased fears that regional conflicts could turn into real nuclear wars.

South Asia is not the only region where these fears are growing. There is a pressing need for measures to stop and reverse nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and Northeast

Asia as well. In all three regions, national rivalries are combining with nuclear weapons ambitions to create new and potentially catastrophic nuclear dangers, which carry long-term repercussions. Some recent developments offer opportunities for arresting and reversing regional nuclear proliferation. The positive Brazil-Argentina experience of abandoning nuclear weapons programs shows that regional nuclear ambitions can be prevented through similar regional and bilateral confidence-building and cooperative arrangements to those found in the Brazil-Argentina Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABAAC).

The proliferation of missile technology and nuclear weapons in the Middle East, especially given the region's instability and strategic importance, is impossible to ignore. The continuing existence of nuclear weapons and the ever-present threat of acquisition of these weapons by others, constitute a peril to global peace and security and to the safety and survival of the people we are dedicated to protect.

From the Arab perspective, the primary danger is Israel. The strategic importance of a nuclear weapons program to Israel is that it neutralizes the Arab firepower and troop advantage. Iraq, Libya, Syria and Iran are pursuing nuclear weapons, and it is believed that Iran is only a few years away from building a bomb. In September 2000, Iraq briefly moved elements of four to five divisions toward its border with Syria in a show of solidarity, and on several occasions since then, Saddam Hussein has threatened to destroy Israel. Then, on January 2001, his oldest son Uday reasserted Irag's claim to Kuwait. With its conventional military capabilities hobbled by two bloody wars and more than a decade of sanctions, Irag's retained WMD capabilities assume renewed salience. Iran, which is a signatory of the NPT and officially claims to have no nuclear weapons program, is known to have obtained nuclear weapons technology from China in the past, and is rumored to have received additional nuclear materials through Russian. Iraq, Iran, and Libya have all violated international norms and laws by developing or seeking to develop their own nuclear weapons systems. Libya, although not a signatory of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), has historically posed the least threat because it lacks both the economic resources and the political alliances to obtain the necessary components of a nuclear weapons program. However, the collapse of the Soviet empire and the questionable security of the Russian nuclear arsenal (i.e., its vulnerability to theft and corruption) bode well for Libya's future acquisition efforts. Moreover, given the fact that Libyan leader Qadhafi has publicly stated his desire to attack everywhere from New York to Washington to Moscow to Naples (where there is a NATO base), the Libyan threat cannot be taken lightly. The NPT has been widely criticized in both the UN General Assembly and among

international security analysts, clearly demonstrating its ineffectiveness by the discovery of the Iraqi (Iraq is a signatory to the NPT) nuclear weapons build-up during the Gulf War, as well as by China's rumored sale of nuclear weapons technology to Iran. Lax physical security standards, a ready supply of nuclear materials, desperate workers, and an already established demand pool of proliferants who do not necessarily view the use of nuclear weapons as irrational have provided the recipe for continued and accelerating nuclear leakage.

The options include diplomacy, economic sanctions, providing economic and political incentives, and ranges to military intervention. Aside from changing the regime in Iraq, one way to persuade Iran not to cross the nuclear threshold would be the establishment of better relations with the United States followed by Iran's inclusion in Middle East regional security discussions and economic development plans. We must change the attitude and behavior of the Arabic Countries towards Israel and the peace process, including their support for radical groups dedicated to using violence to disrupt peace negotiations. The Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus (all three of whom had inherited programs from the Soviet Union) surrendered their nuclear programs after being provided with considerable economic and political incentive. Iraq, an NPT signatory, has been recently brought back into the NPT regime through international sanctions following the discovery of nuclear weapons technology during the Gulf War. Introduce economic sanctions against nations acquiring technology and nuclear parts. The United States should offer to lift international sanctions immediately in exchange for Iraq and Iran's agreement not to acquire certain categories of offensive weapons, such as tanks and jet fighters, or to acquire or test ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, without the approval of the UN Security Council. Before the sanctions are lifted, the UN Security Council should be allowed to return arms inspectors to Iraq and stop Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs, which have dangerous consequences for the Middle East. If Iraq and Iran acquires unauthorized weapons, the United States or any other member of the Security Council should have the authority to destroy the weapons. Otherwise, Iraq and Iran would be free to spend its oil revenues as it wished. Reduce present and planned stockpiles of nuclear weapons are exceedingly large and should now be greatly cut back. Gradually and transparently take remaining nuclear weapons off alert, and their readiness substantially reduced both in nuclear weapons states and in de facto nuclear weapons states. Long-term international nuclear policy has to be based on the declared principle of continuous, complete and irrevocable elimination of nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia should, without any reduction in their military security, carry forward the reduction process already launched by

START - they should cut down to 1000 to 1500 warheads each and possibly lower. The other nuclear states should be drawn into the reduction process as still deeper reductions are negotiated down to the level of hundreds. If Iraq and Iran tests ballistic missiles, the United States should retaliate by attacking whatever missiles or other heavy weapons that could be located. This strategy requires that the United States maintain a military presence in the region with one or two wings of tactical aircraft and one or two armored brigades.

The United States and Russia must initiate a new round of regular, comprehensive talks on international security, arms control, and disarmament. These discussions should include strategic and all other types of nuclear arms, missile defenses, and other steps that should be taken to reduce nuclear dangers, such as those discussed below.

Creative ways need to be found to revitalize bilateral strategic arms reductions. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I, ratified by both countries, contains monitoring arrangements that could be applied to deeper reductions. START II, signed in January 1993 more than six years ago, is still not in force. Formal US-Russian negotiations on a follow-on START III agreement have yet to begin, although the outlines of an ambitious set of negotiating objectives has been sketched, treaty ratification and implementation has become too weighed down by . conditions, complications, and political partisanship. Even if the Duma consents to ratify START II, Russian implementation might be conditional on the US Senate's reaffirmation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which is by no means assured. The more time that passes without ratification of START II, the less relevant this treaty becomes. Over the next 10 to 15 years, deployed warheads on Russian strategic nuclear forces are widely estimated to fall, not just below START II levels but also perhaps to half of projected START III levels. Russian nuclear forces produced in large numbers in the 1980s face block obsolescence, and Russia does not have the funds to keep this large force in the field. Waiting for ratification and entry-into-force of treaties requiring reductions well short of those caused by aging, is an inappropriate response to increased nuclear dangers.

But, if a threat exists, we should also maintain a response system that can continue to ensure our safety. The military should continue to be given the power to respond with nuclear weapons if necessary. Against the smallest form of nuclear attack, however, the appropriate response is not as clear. In the words of former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, "no one in public life will stand up and say we can afford to retreat; we can ignore our commitments; we can build a wall around America,"³¹ To stop and reverse the global spread of nuclear

weapons, the international community needs to recognize the magnitude of proliferation dangers and take corrective action based on a comprehensive strategy.

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ENDNOTES

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